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Defendants and Appellees Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud submit the 
following Appellees' Brief in the above-referenced proceeding. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellees agree with Appellant's statement of jurisdiction of this case. 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to the appeal are Plaintiff and Appellant J. Pochynok Company, Inc. 
(hereafter "Plaintiff/Appellant" or "Pochynok"), and Defendants and Appellees Gregory 
Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud (hereafter "Defendants/Appellees" or "Smedsruds"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the lower court erred in granting to Defendants/Appellees all 
attorneys' fees incurred after May 9, 2002, pursuant to Utah Code Arm. § 38-1-18(3), by 
reason of Appellant's refusal of Appellees' Offer of Judgment made on that date, in that 
this action was filed before enactment of that provision by the Utah Legislature. 
2. Whether the lower court erred in granting to Defendants/Appellees all costs 
and attorneys' fees incurred in this matter before May 9, 2002, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§38-1-17 and 38-1-18. 
3. Whether the lower court erred in upholding Defendants/Appellees' writ of 
garnishment to Zions First National Bank, in that Plaintiff/Appellant failed to offer 
evidence, or otherwise to establish, that the funds on deposit in its depository account 
were not its property. 
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Issue 1 ib a question of law relating to the retroactivity of the statute relied on, 
which this Court review's for correctness - J ODM . , . : t 
l s s u e 2 concerns the trial court's apportionment of costs (including attorru;\ s" fees) 
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-17 and 38-1-18 As applicable case law c iou^ ihi ;* u\\ 
court with discretion in this analysis, its decisioi i ii i tf lis i egai (1 is i e ' I 
•. \\>muvt, 18 Utah 2d 130, 4i/l\2d-140^1900), 
AK&R Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy 47 P.3d 92 (UT App 2002); Aui v Jlolden, 
I \ P. 3(1781 (Utah 2002). 
I s s u e ' . . - . - . • - • • P. *!,'.-• .-
is go\ ei i led * - noneous slandaid - see Morse v. Packer, 15 P.3d 1<0* ^ ! .!> 
2000). 
STATEMEN 1 OF THE CASE 
. . . -* . .-. . ;* tm" f -m-i Mate of 
I Jtah. Defendant aiiu -rwllecs Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud, as owners, 
were sued by Plaintiff/Appellant J. Pochynok Company, Inc. for breach of contract and 
quantum meiml Plamlili and Appellant I I i'lii"i mol i 'iim|iiin\ l'uitlni soiij'"lnl lo 
^ '..uuc b liens asserted against the Defendants/Appellees' 
residence. Defendants and Appellees counterclaimed, asserting defective workmanship 
and it icompletion of the project. 
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The matter was set for jury trial commencing May 21, 2002. On May 9, 2002, 
counsel for Defendants and Appellees presented Plaintiff/Appellant with an offer of 
judgment in the amount of $40,000 (see Addendum 1 hereto, R 408-410). Plaintiff/ 
Appellant declined the offer, and the case proceeded to trial. 
The case was tried to a jury on May 21-22, 2002. In its case in chief 
Plaintiff/Appellant initially claimed $81,269.91 in damages (having plead $74,360.51 in 
its complaint - R. 1-6; 200-207); during the course of trial, though, Plaintiff/Appellant 
was inconsistent in the computation of its claim. Defendants/Appellees put on 
substantial proof concerning unearned supervisor fees, defective work which had to be 
redone, or which diminished the value of the home. Following deliberation, the jury 
returned a verdict (net of offsets) of only $7,096.00 for Plaintiff/Appellant. 
See Addendum 2 hereto (R. 354-355). Plaintiff/Appellant does not appeal the jury 
verdict. 
On May 31, 2002, Defendants and Appellees moved the court for an order taxing 
costs and attorneys' fees which they had incurred in the litigation. Plaintiff/Appellant 
J. Pochynok Company opposed the motion of Defendants and Appellees, and filed its 
own motion for an award of costs and fees. Both parties submitted evidence of costs and 
attorneys' fees in the form of affidavits by legal counsel. 
By minute entry dated July 25, 2002 (R. 621-622), the trial court granted 
Defendant/Appellees' motion to tax costs and attorneys' fees, and denied 
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Plaintiff/Appellant 's motion. Judgment u p o n the verdict was thereupon entered by the 
Court on August !>, 2002 as lol lows: 
a. Jiidgiiinii iv i* Dili | mi I'M ii of Plaintiff I Pocbynok C o m p a m , 
Inc., and against Defendants Gregory Smedsrud and Lou Ann Smedsrud, 
jo int ly and severally, in the amount of $7,076.56, together wi th interest 
tliei eon fi on: i i ai i i aftei IV la.) r 22. 2002 i n itil paid ii i fit ill at tl le • :onti act i ate of 
I *o
 o p C r a m i u l I L 
b . Judgment was entered in f au i -)f T \ f /mhn t s Gregory and I nuAnn 
Smedsrud, jo in t ly and severally, as \ t I . hi iff J. I 'och> i 10k 
Compam , Ii IC ii i the fc lie ( • >« 
i . $1,906.94, represent ing Defendants ' costs of suit incurred 
prioi t< i May 9, 2002; 
ii. VIK,()tt -i Hi representing Defenda: 
i > ;?oo), 
iii. $766.50, represent ing Defendants ' costs of suit incurred on 
and after M a y 9, 2002; 
iv. 1> ? 4,JMi Ilu irpii 'sri i lui i1 in N'lnnl mis' iiifniinn s" fors iin nnvd 
on and after M a y 9, 2002; and 
v. Interest was awarded on the foregoing amounts from and after 
I\ la> 22, 2002 i intil j >aid ii i fi ill \ ii 1 1 le c< n t! i \ i d i; ; i/l c < >f 1 2 ( ! /0. 
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The Judgment further denied Plaintiff/Appellant's petition for foreclosure of its 
mechanic's lien against the residence of Defendants/Appellees, holding that 
Plaintiff/Appellant held no right, title or interest therein. See Addendum 3 hereto 
(R. 635-640) 
On August 23, 2002, Plaintiff/Appellant moved the court for an order altering or 
amending the judgment under Rule 59 (e). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which was 
denied by order of the lower court on October 7, 2002 (R. 629-631). 
On September 2, 2002, Defendants/Appellants sought and obtained issuance of a 
writ of garnishment to Zions First National Bank as garnishee, seeking garnishment of all 
funds on deposit in any depositoiy accounts maintained by Plaintiff/Appellant. On 
September 12, 2002, Zions First National Bank returned an amended response to the 
garnishee interrogatories1, indicating that Plaintiff/Appellant maintained funds on deposit 
in the amount of $37,585.00, and froze the same pending further order of the court - see 
Addendum 4 (R. 700-705). 
Plaintiff/Appellant requested a hearing on Defendants'/Appellees' writ of 
garnishment on September 23, 2002, asserting that the funds on deposit in its Zions Bank 
account were being held for payment of subcontractors on a separate project, and 
therefore exempt from garnishment. The matter was called on for hearing before the trial 
court on October 7, 2002 (R. 726). Plaintiff/Appellant presented no evidence to 
contradict the answers of Zions First National Bank to Defendants'/Appellees' garnishee 
1
 In a prior response, Zions had inadvertently garnished Defendants' account. 
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interrogatories; accordingly, at the conclusion of argument, the court ruled that Plaintiffs 
objections to the writ of garnishment were not well-taken. 
'.! llinr In ill mill ilium i l inn II l'n li mliiul'i and AppelK v . f i l n l i piopoM il l iun i ! 
o r c j e r 011 t j i e w r [ t 0f garnishment. On October 16, though, Plaintiff/Appellant moved for a 
"new trial" on the writ of garnishment under Rule 59, I J tail Rules of Civil Procedure 
< • lie Motion was accompanied by tlie A ffida ^ it of Joh 111 'ochynok, owner 
not been offered or introduced into evidence at the October 7 hearing (R. 766-76^;. i lie 
com l denied Plaintiff/Appellant's Rule 59 motion (R. 849-851), and no appeal is taken 
therefrom t,^\ .. -iu v. . . . \,,;*.;:. R 816 81 "/ ) \ i i il ing issued Octobe i 1 5 , 2002 , 
o\ ei i i iliiif Plaintiff/A ' >b jections to the w i it and ordering funds released to 
Defendants/Appellees. See Addendum 5 hereto (R.776-779). 
Plaintiff/Appellant filed its Notice cf Appcil o^ Vovembu 4, ^v.1 On 
•• ' •
 !
 d 
be required for this appeal (R. 852-853). 
S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS 
Most of the salient i acts i elev ai it to this appeal arise i lot fron I the underlying 
dispi itc; (resoh eel b;; a jm n j \ ei diet ft. oi it i \ 1 licl 11 LO appeal is taken).,, but from post-trial 
proceedings which are fully described in the foregoing Statement of the Case. The 
following Statement of Facts briefly sets out additional inforn lat'ion relevant to the 
argument \ 
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1. By this action, Plaintiff and Appellant J. Pochynok Company, Inc. sought 
an order of the Court foreclosing a mechanic's lien interest in property located at 7100 
Canyon Road in Summit County, Slate of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1, et 
seq. See Plaintiffs Amended Lien Foreclosure Complaint herein (R. 200-208). 
2. Plaintiffs claims were based upon a Notice of Mechanic's Lien filed with 
the Summit County Recorder's office on October 19, 1999, in the amount of $74,360.51, 
together with interest, $100 in costs and attorneys' fees (R, 208-402). 
3. Plaintiff had previously filed, and then released, a Notice of Mechanic's 
Lien against Defendants' property on July 26, 1999 in the amount of $150,000, plus 
interest, costs and attorneys' fees (R. 405). 
4. Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim asserted, inter alia, defective 
workmanship and delay damages. See Defendants' Answer to Plaintiffs Amended Lien 
Foreclosure Complaint and Counterclaim herein (R. 19-29; 211-218). 
5. This matter was set for trial to a jury commencing May 21, 2002. 
6. On May 9, 2002, Defendants submitted to Plaintiff, through its counsel, an 
offer of judgment in the amount of $40,000, tendered pursuant to Utah Code Ami. § 38-1-
18(3). See Addendum 1 hereto (R. 408-410). 
7. Plaintiff never accepted Defendants' May 9, 2002 offer of judgment. 
8. This matter was tried to a jury on May 21 and 22, 2002. 
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9. At trial, Plaintiff asserted a claim against Defendants in the amount of 
$81,269.91 (exclusive of costs and attorneys' fees). See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 26 (R. 
412-431). 
10. During trial, Defendants presented evidence that they were entitled to 
significant offsets for unearned supervisor fees, work defects and delays. Defendants 
further produced evidence that they had never received a consistent accounting from 
Plaintiff despite nearly three years of negotiations and attempts, contradictory and 
inconsistent claims coming from Plaintiff right up to the eve of trial. 
11. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a general verdict in 
favor of Plaintiff in the amount of only $7,076.56. See Addendum 2 hereto (R. 354-355). 
12. Prior to and through May 9, 2002, Defendants incurred $1,906.94 in costs 
and $48,083.10 in attorneys' fees. Affidavit of Ross I. Romero (R. 435-459). 
13. Between May 10, 2002 and the entry of judgment, Defendants/Appellees 
incurred $775.70 in costs and $33,280.00 in attorneys' fees. Affidavit of Ross I. Romero 
(R. 435-459). 
14. Pursuant to writ of garnishment to Zions First National Bank as garnishee, 
Defendants/Appellees recovered $37,585.00 from Plaintiff/Appellant's account. (R. 700-
705). 
15. In its sworn answers to garnishee interrogatories, Zions expressly 
acknowledged that J. Pochynok was the company owner of the garnished account, and set 
out the amount on deposit (R. 700-705). 
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16. Contrary to the clear implication in paragraphs 11-17 of Appellant's 
Statement of Facts (Appellant's brief at pp. 8-9), Plaintijf/Appellantpresented no 
evidence whatsoever to the trial court at the October 7, 2002 hearing on 
Defendants/Appellees' writ of garnishment to Zions First National Bank. As such, not 
one of the facts set out in those paragraphs was established by testimony, by documents 
or other physical evidence offered or received into evidence, or otherwise. Rather, they 
were set out in an affidavit signed by John Pochynok, and filed with the trial court on 
October 16, 2002 - nine days after the court had already granted Plaintiff/Appellant a 
hearing on its objections to the writ of garnishment, and ruled against them, and over a 
month after the return on the writ of garnishment was filed by the garnishee. (R. 766-
769) PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS 
There are no prior or related appeals herein. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Ann. §31-1-17: 
Except as provided in § 38-11-107, as between the owner and 
the contractor, the Court shall apportion the costs according 
to the right of the case. . . . 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1): 
Except as provided in § 38-11-107 and in subsection (2), in 
any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter, the 
successful party shall be entitled to recovery a reasonable 
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the Court, which shall be taxed 
as costs in the action. 
594240vl 
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3. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3): 
A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien 
under this chapter may make an offer of judgment pursuant to 
Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If the offer is 
not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree 
is not more favorable that the offer, the offeree shall pay the 
costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the offerer after the offer 
was made.2 
4. Rule64D(h),U.R.C.P.: 
The Defendant or any other person who owns or claims an 
interest in the property subject to garnishment that is 
garnisheed may request a hearing to claim any exemption to 
the garnishment, or to challenge the issuance of the writ or the 
accuracy of the answers to interrogatories. . . . The request 
for a hearing shall be in the form to enable the defendant or 
other person to specify the grounds upon which the defendant 
or other person challenges the issuance of the writ or the 
accuracy of the answers to interrogatories. . . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly awarded to Defendants and Appellees Smedsruds all 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred after May 9, 2002, the date on which they made an 
offer of judgment to Pochynok. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) mandates an award of 
attorneys' fees in all mechanic's lien cases where the claimant does not recover more than 
an offer of judgment. As Pochynok's net recovery amounted to only a fraction of the 
$40,000 offered it on May 9, 2002, application of the statute required an award of 
Defendants'/ Appellees' post-May 9 attorneys' fees. 
2
 Rule 68, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, permits the extension of an offer of judgment at any time more 
than 10 days prior to the commencement of trial. 
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Plaintiffs/Appellant's claim that the statute should be inapplicable, as it was 
enacted after this case had been filed, ignores the remedial nature of the statute. Under 
governing law, a substantive law may be applied only prospectively, whereas a remedial 
law is applied retroactively. Case law from numerous jurisdictions has established 
beyond contention that a legislative enactment providing an award of attorneys' fees is 
remedial in nature, and may operate retrospectively. Moreover, the statute simply 
clarifies the prior version of Utah Code. Ann. § 38-1-18 to specify a category of 
"successful party" under that provision as previously enacted. 
Defendants and Appellees, moreover, must be deemed the "successful parties," for 
puiposes of Utah Code. Ann. §§ 38-1-17 and 38-1-18, and the lower court's awrard of all 
costs and fees was not an abuse its discretion. Under the balancing test mandated by 
Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 P.2d 246 (1966), coupled with the "flexible, 
reasoned approach" to detennining the "successful party," as mandated in the case law-
handed down since that time, Smedsruds were clearly the successful parties in this case. 
They defeated all but a fraction of Pochynok's mechanic's lien claims through assertion 
of rights of setoff. Given their statutory entitlement to post-May 9 attorneys' fees, 
moreover, the net recovery in the case goes in favor of Defendants and Appellees, and 
renders them the "successful parties" under any definition. 
Finally, the lower court did not err in permitting garnishment of funds on deposit 
in J. Pochynok Company's bank account with Zions First National Bank. 
Plaintiff/Appellant J. Pochynok Company asserts that the funds were actually the 
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property of a third party, paid to J. Pochynok Company in connection with a separate 
construction project. The argument suffers two failings, however. First, 
Plaintiff/Appellant offered no evidence to support its contention in this regard when the 
matter was heard on October 7, 2002. Far from carrying the required burden of proof by 
"clear and convincing evidence" that the funds were not J. Pochynok Company's property 
notwithstanding their deposit in its bank account with Zions, J. Pochynok Company 
furnished not one scrap of evidence to support its position. Second, even the evidence 
offered by affidavit after the hearing conclusively concluded established only that the 
funds on deposit in the account had been paid to J. Pochynok Company in connection 
with another construction project, pursuant to a contract with the owner/payer. At that 
point, the funds became the property of Plaintiff?Appellant, to be paid to whichever 
creditor it saw fit to pay (subject, however, to judicial process in the form of writs of 
garnishment). The fact that Plaintiff/Appellant Pochynok would have preferred to pay 
subcontiactors on another project, at Smedsruds' expense, does not alter its ownership of 
the funds, or their susceptibility to garnishment by Defendants and Appellees. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED TO 
DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES ALL ATTORNEYS' FEES 
INCURRED AFTER MAY 9, 2002 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) provides as follows: 
A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien 
under this chapter may make an offer of judgment pursuant to 
Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If the offer is 
not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree 
is not more favorable that the offer, the offeree shall pay the 
costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the offerer after the offer 
was made.3 
The language of 38-1-18(3) is mandatoiy. By making their offer of judgment of $40,000 
on May 9, 2002, Defendants/Appellees became statutorily entitled to a recovery of all 
costs and attorneys' fees incurred after that date if Plaintiff/Appellant, as lienholder, 
failed to recover more than the amount of the offer at trial. It is undisputed that 
Plaintiffs/Appellant's recovery, net of offsets asserted by Defendants/Appellees, was 
only a fraction of the offer amount. Without more, then, Defendants and Appellees were 
statutorily entitled to an award of costs in the amount of $775.70, and attorneys' fees in 
the amount of $33,280.00. 
Plaintiffs/Appellant's only response to this is that Section 38-1-18(3) was enacted 
effective April, 2001-more than a year before Defendants and Appellees made their Offer 
3
 Rule 68, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, permits the extension of an offer of judgment at any time more 
than 10 days prior to the commencement of trial. 
594240vl 
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of Judgment in this matter, but after the case had been filed. Plaintiff argues, without 
authority, that Section 38-1-18(3) "plainly affects substantive or vested rights," and 
therefore may not be applied to any portion of a lawsuit filed before its effective date.4 
Defendants' Offer of Judgment was made pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, as was required by section 38-1-18. It was made pursuant to a 
procedural rule and was therefore remedial in nature. Defendants, although not required, 
clarified their offer by referencing section 38-1-18 to put Plaintiff on notice that they 
would be seeking their attorneys' fees from the date of offer should plaintiffs fail to 
collect at least the amount offered. In sum, there should be no question about the nature 
of Defendants' offer being procedural. 
Further, whether a statute is applied retroactively depends on the nature of the 
enactment. The Utah Court of Appeals recently articulated the applicable standard in the 
case of Wilde v. Wilde, 35 P.3d 341 (UT App 2001), cited in Appellant's brief: 
"As a general rule, amendments which 'affect substantive or 
invested rights . . . operate prospectively' [citing Department 
of Social Service v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982)]. 
However, if an amendment is procedural or remedial, then it 
applies to accrued, pending and future actions. See Id. . . . 'A 
substantive law creates, defines and regulates the rights and 
duties of the parties which may give rise to a cause of action." 
[quoting Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (UT App 1998)] . . . A 
procedural or remedial law cprovid[es] a different mode or 
form of procedure for enforcing substantive rights,' [citation 
4
 Plaintiff/Appellant cites to the cases of Wilde v. Wilde, 35 P.3d 341 (UT App 2001) mdJohansen v. 
Johansen, 2002 Ut. App. 75 (UT App 2002), both of which concern statutory modifications of alimony rights. 
Alimony is clearly a vested, substantive right which may not be disturbed through retroactive legislation. For those 
reasons set out herein, though, an award of attorneys' fees incurred in litigation is a procedural device, not a 
substantive right. See also discussion of the Wilde decision, infra. 
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omitted], or clarifies the meaning of an earlier enactment, 
[citation omitted]" 35 P.3d at page 344-345, 
See also State Department of Human Services v. Jacoby, 975 P.2d 939 (UT App 1999) 
(holding that an enactment extending the applicable statute of limitations was procedural, 
and applied retroactively); Moore v. American Coal Company, 111 P.2d 989 (Utah 1987) 
(holding that a post-filing legislative enactment making hearing on a workmen's 
compensation claim discretionary with the administrative law judge defeated no 
substantive right, but was procedural and therefore retroactive). 
For the reasons set out below, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) is clearly remedial 
and procedural, and applicable to the Offer of Judgment made in this action 13 months 
after its enactment. 
A, Statutory Enactments Granting Attorneys' Fees Have Been Expressly 
Held Procedural and Remedial, and Applied Retroactively to Pending 
Litigation, 
Although no Utah court has ruled directly on the question, other jurisdictions have 
expressly held that the statute granting a right to attorneys' fees is procedure and remedial 
in nature, and therefore applicable retroactively to cases pending on its effective date. 
In the case of Veloedman v. Cornell, 161 Or. App. 396, 984 P.2d 906 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1999), the court retroactively applied a statute authorizing awards of attorneys' fees 
to prevailing parties in actions for injuries to crops. The court began by observing that 
neither the statute itself nor its legislative history, stated whether or not it was to be given 
retroactively application. The court then stated the following: 
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The pertinent maximum of construction is that, in the absence 
of evidence of what the legislature actually intended, we 
presume that it intended retroactive effect to be given to 
statutes that are "remedial" or "procedural," as opposed to 
"substantive" in nature [citation omitted]. In this case, two 
factors lead us to conclude that OR.S 105.810(2) is remedial 
or procedural and, thus, retroactive. 
First, we observe the essentially remedial nature of the statute 
as a whole. The Supreme Court has explained that, at least in 
the context of determining the retroactivity of statutes, 
"remedial" statutes are those "which pertain to or affect a 
remedy, as distinguished from those which affect or modify a 
substantive right or duty."[citation omitted] OR.S 105.810 is 
such a statute. It provides property owners a statutory remedy 
for the unlawful taking of crops, a remedy that includes treble 
damages and, since 1995, attorneys' fees. The attorneys' fees 
provision was added to the statute without altering any 
underlying legal duties. 
Second, we observe that OR.S 105.810(2) provides for an 
award of attorneys' fees as "reimbursement of reasonable 
costs of litigation." The distinction between attorneys' fees 
as costs and attorneys' fees as a consequence of substantive 
liability has proven critical in prior cases." 
984 P.2d at pages 908-909. 
Similarly, in the case oiMcCormack v. Town of Granite, 913 P.2d 282 (Okl. 
1996), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated that "statutes relating to the award of 
attorney fees to a prevailing party are procedural, and subject to retrospective operation." 
(913 P.2d at page 285). See also Quails v. Farmers Insurance Company, Inc., 629 P.2d 
1258 (Okl. 1981) ("The general rule that the statutes will be given prospective operation 
only . . . does not apply to statutes affecting procedure. . . .Taxing of attorneys' fees as 
costs relates to a motive procedure."). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) clearly falls within the holding of the foregoing 
authorities. Enacted in 2001, it modified the language of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 
(initially enacted well before this action was filed, which provided for attorneys' fees to 
be "taxed as costs in the action" to the "successful party") (see POINT II below). As 
enacted, subsection (3) did not enlarge, contract, modify or otherwise affect any 
contractual or other substantive right held by J. Pochynok Company, Inc. at the time this 
action began. It neither created nor revoked any substantive right giving rise to any civil 
cause of action.5 
By definition, in fact, Section 38-1-18(3) has nothing to do with the substantive 
rights and obligations giving rise to the parties" claims in the litigation. It cannot be 
invoked until the case is already pending. By its express terms, however, the Offer of 
Judgment contemplated by the statute may, under Rule 68, be made at any time up to ten 
days prior to trial. 
On its face, the statute is a procedural device for mitigating the impact of 
attorneys' fee awards on minuscule recoveries by over-reaching contractors. It is a 
procedural, cost-shifting devise, and nothing more. Based on the clear weight of 
authority, it should be treated as remedial and procedural, rather than substantive, and 
given retroactive application to this case. 
5
 By definition, awards of attorneys' fees are not "damages" under law-see Rodwater v. Old Republic 
Surety, 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993); Collier v. Heinz, 827 P.2d 982 (UT App 1992). 
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B. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) Clarifies the Prior 
Enactment. 
Prior to April 1, 2001, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 stated the following: 
Except as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-1076, as 
between the owner and the contractor the court shall 
apportion the costs according to the right of the case, but in 
any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the 
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed 
as costs in the action. 
By adding subsection (3) in 2001, the legislature further illuminated its intent as to 
who was the "successful party" under § 38-1-18 as previously enacted. Should the 
property owner make an Offer of Judgment for more than the contractor's ultimate 
recovery of trial, the legislature clearly concluded, the property owner - not the 
contractor-should be deemed the "successful party" under § 38-1-18 with respect to costs 
and attorneys' fees incurred after the offer was made. 
In other words, subsection (3) simply defined, directed and clarified the 
application of § 38-1-18 in situations where an Offer of Judgment had been made-an area 
clearly within the court's discretion prior to 2001, as addressed at POINT II, below. As 
such, the 2001 enactment should be given retroactive application to a case pending prior 
to its effective date, particularly when the Offer of Judgment was made well after that 
time. 
6
 The reference section concerned mechanic's lien claims on residential properties by subcontractors 
which is not applicable in the present case. 
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C. Had Plaintiff Accepted Defendants' Offer Of Judgment Thev Would 
Have Been Bound By It 
In arguing that § 38-1-18(3) should have only prospective application, J. Pochynok 
Company ignores a fundamental inequity. Had J. Pochynok Company accepted 
Defendants'/Appellees' May 9, 2002 Offer of Judgment in this matter, it would have 
been statutorily entitled to entry of judgment thereon under Rule 68, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Defendants would have had no means of avoiding entry of judgment thereon 
by claiming that § 38-1-18(3) should be afforded only prospective application. Having 
elected to decline the offer, PlaintifffAppellant should not be pennitted to make the same 
self argument in his own interests. 
With regard, finally, to J. Pochynok Company's observation that the attorneys' 
fees which it incurred in trial should be added to the amount of the verdict in determining 
whether or not its recovery exceeded the amount of the offer, the response is simple: 
J. Pochynok Company recovered no fees, at trial or thereafter. The judgment entered in 
this matter cannot be massaged in any way that makes it "more favorable than the offer"; 
accordingly, J. Pochynok Company's argument based on what might have happened, or 
even what should have happened, is moot. 
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING 
TO DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES THEIR COSTS 
AND ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED PRIOR TO 
MAY 9, 2002. 
Actions brought (or defended) under Utah's Mechanic's Liens Statute fall within a 
statutory exception to the general rule that, in civil litigation matters, the parties each bear 
their respective costs and attorneys' fees. Utah's Mechanic's Lien Act calls for an award 
of costs and attorneys' fees to the "successful party" in a lien foreclosure action. 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that the term "successful party" for 
purposes of award costs and attorneys' fees, must be viewed in light of two separate 
statutory provisions, which have been interpreted to complement each other. Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-18(1) provides as follows: 
Except as provided in § 38-11-107 and in subsection (2), in 
any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter, the 
successful party shall be entitled to recovery a reasonable 
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the Court, which shall be taxed 
as costs in the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-1-17, however, reads as follows: 
Except as provided in § 38-11-107, as between the owner and 
the contractor, the Court shall apportion the costs according 
to the right of the case. . . . 
In the early case of Shape v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 P.2d 246 (1966), the Utah 
Supreme Court was faced with a case in which (precisely as in the case before the Court 
in this action) a building contractor sought to foreclose a mechanic's lien claim against a 
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propeity owner pursuant to a cost-plus-ten-percent building contract. There, as here, the 
jury had returned a verdict in favor of the contractor, but for substantially less than the 
amount of the contractor's mechanic's lien claim or the amount asserted at trial. The trial 
Court rejected the contractor's claim that he had been the "successful party" at trial and 
the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. In its opinion, the Court quoted the language of § 17 
and 18 of the Mechanic's Lien Statute set out above, and then stated the following: 
It is plain that these two sections relating to this subject 
should be construed together and that when attorney fees are 
awardable thereunder, they are to be treated as costs, which, 
as expressed in 38-1-17 the Court 'shall apportion the cost 
according to the right of the case.' 
417P.2dat249. 
More recent cases are in accord. J. Pochynok Company cites the Court to its 
decision iwAK&R Whipple Plumbing & Healing v. Guy, 47 P.3d 92 (UT App 2002) for 
the proposition that a "successful party" in a mechanic's lien action must be determined 
by a mechanical, winner-take-all, net-recovery rule. Contrary to Plaintiffs/Appellant's 
argument, though, the Whipple decision stands for the proposition that a trial court's 
determination of who is the "successful (or prevailing) party" is not a mechanical process 
at all (unless all claims run one way only); that, where claims in a civil action run both 
ways and both parties are to a degree successful, the court must adopt "a flexible and 
reasoned approach", taking into consideration the practical and substantive outcome of 
the litigation. In fact, the court's opinion, while determining that "successful party" and 
"prevailing party" were synonymous terms, expressly noted that: 
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we do not suggest that whether a claim is ultimately 
determined to be enforceable under the conditions of Section 
38-1-18 is not a factor to be considered in determining which 
party or parties prevail or are successful. 
(47 P.3d at 95.) The court's language here has specific application to this case, where 
Smedsruds offered judgment for nearly six times Plaintiffs ultimate recovery, and thus 
became entitled as a matter of law to all attorneys' fees incurred after May 9, 2002 (the 
sum total of which far eclipsed Plaintiff s jury verdict). While Whipple rejected the stiict 
"net recovery" rule in cases where (as here), both parties realize on claims, Smedsruds' 
statutory entitlement to post-May 9 attorneys' fees clearly dictates a net balance in their 
favor. Certainly, under the "flexible and reasoned approach" mandated by Whipple, the 
court's decision in this case is unassailable. 
The Whipple decision, moreover, expressly invoked and affirmed the Court of 
Appeals' decision in Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 1990), the holding which expressly validates the Court's ruling in this action. 
In Occidental the plaintiff brought a trust deed deficiency action against the Defendant, 
seeking also an award of costs and attorneys' fees (in that case under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-32). The trial court observed that, of its six-figure deficiency claim, the plaintiff 
recovered only $7,339.44. Based thereon, the trial court determined that, even though 
plaintiff obtained a judgment against Defendants, they were the "prevailing parties" by 
reason of the nominal amount thereof, and awarded them costs and attorneys' fees. The 
court of appeals affirmed: 
At trial, Occidental obtained a judgment of approximately 
$7300. It argues that a money judgment in its favor entitles it 
to attorneys' fees as the prevailing party. As stated above, 
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this court has recognized the need for a flexible and reasoned 
approach to making determinations of who is the prevailing 
party. 
In the case at hand, Occidental claimed a balance due of over 
$600,000 resulting from the trustee's sale held in April 1986 
. . . The Mehrs were successful in defending against 
Occidental's claim for a $600,000 deficiency based on the 
April sale. The Mehrs successfully demonstrated the validity 
of the December sale, thus the deficiency judgment was for 
the stipulated amount of $7339.44. In light of the 
circumstances involved and the issues contested at trial, the 
trial court did not err in granting the Melirs attorneys' fees 
and costs as the prevailing party. 
791 P. 2d at 222. In Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Savings, then, as in the instant case, the 
trial court sustained an award of attorneys' fees to a party which successfully defeated all 
but a token amount of the opposing party's claim. Occidental directly defeats the claim 
of Plaintiff in this action to the effect that any award of a money judgment automatically 
entitles the recipient to the status of "prevailing party," and to an award of attorneys' fees 
as a matter of law. Rather, the Court must look to the realities of the case, and adopt the 
Court of Appeals' "flexible and reasoned approach" to an av/ard of attorneys' fees. 
Under the Occidental/Nebraska decision, as affirmed in Whipple, the Court's ruling in 
this action should stand. 
Finally, the "flexible and reasoned approach" dictated by Occidental and Whipple 
was affirmed and expanded in the recent Utah Supreme Court decision of R.T. Nielson 
Company v. Cook 2002 UT 11, 2002 Utah LEXIS 16 (Utah 2002): 
As the court of appeals noted in Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, determining the prevailing party 
for puiposes of awarding fees can often times be quite simple. 
783 P.2d 551, 555 (Ut. 1989). Where a plaintiff sues for 
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money damages, and plaintiff wins, plaintiff is the prevailing 
party; if defendant successfully defends and avoids adverse 
judgment, defendant has prevailed. Id. This simple analysis 
cannot always be employed, however... 
Which party is the prevailing party is an appropriate question 
for the trial court. This question depends, to a large measure, 
on the context of each case, and, therefore, it is appropriate to 
leave this determination to the sound discretion of the trial 
court. We therefore review the trial court's determination as to 
who was the prevailing party under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Appropriate considerations for the trial court would 
include, but are not limited to, (1) contractual language, (2) 
the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., 
brought by the parties, (3) the importance of the claims 
relative to each other and their significance in the context of 
the lawsuit considered as a whole, and (4) the dollar amounts 
attached to and awarded in connection with the various 
claims. Based on these and other relevant factors, the trial 
court is in a better position than we are as an appellate court 
to decide which party is the prevailing party. In most cases 
involving language similar to the contractual language before 
us here, there can generally be only one prevailing party. 
[Citations omitted.] However, the standard articulated above 
will permit a case-by-case evaluation by the trial court, and 
flexibility to handle circumstances where both, or neither, 
parties may be considered to have prevailed. 
2002 Utah Lexis at 25. 
In this action, the "right of the case" plainly dictated that Defendants and 
Appellees Gregoiy and Louann Smedsmd be deemed the "successful parties" for 
purposes of an award of costs and attorneys' fees, and the trial court so found. Under the 
R.T. Nielson standard, as well as that in Occidental and Whipple, the trial court's 
determination was clearly the correct outcome, and should not be disturbed. 
594240vl -24- 14580.0001 
A. Defendants Defeated Virtually All of Plaintiffs Mechanic's Lien Claim. 
To begin with, while Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff realized a nominal 
recovery on this mechanics lien claim, the award amounted to less than 10% of his 
original mechanics lien claim, and barely 8% of his asserted amount at trial. The jury, as 
trier of fact, was clearly persuaded that Plaintiffs claim was not only excessive, but 
should be all but eclipsed by Defendants9 claimed offsets. 
It was Plaintiffs inability, and unwillingness, to furnish a consistent accounting on 
the pioject which necessitated adjudication of this matter to begin with. Defendants tried 
repeatedly, both before and after completion of the project, to persuade Mr. Pochynok to 
sit down with them and resolve the account. Rather than do so, Plaintiff simply made 
repeated demands for payment, the amount of the demand changing each time (often 
several times in the course of only a few days). Not only were the numbers inconsistent, 
but none would acknowledge a single penny of offset for improper work or delays. 
Any practical application of the principals set out in the decision of Shupe v. 
Menlove, dictates that, apportioning costs and attorneys' fees between owners and 
contract "according to the right of the case" dictates that Smedsruds - not J. Pochynok 
Company - were the "successful party," and should be awarded their costs and attorneys' 
fees. 
B. Defendants' Statutory Right to Attorneys' Fees After May 9, 2002 
Results in a Net Recovery in Their Favor, 
Even to the extent the jury's verdict was nominally in Plaintiffs favor, the effect 
of that verdict is more than offset by Defendants' right to post-May 9 attorneys' fees as 
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set out under Point I, above. Under such circumstances, Defendants/Apellees must be 
deemed the successful litigants in this matter, and their attorneys' fees before May 9, 
2002 likewise awarded. Attorneys' fees under the Mechanics Lien Act are to be awarded 
to the party or parties which are "ultimately successful" - see Calcium v. Systems 
Communications Corp,, 939 P. 2d 185 (UT App 1997).7 
C. The Jury's Verdict Necessarily Implied the Filing of Two Wrongful 
Liens by Plaintiff. 
As noted above, J. Pochynok Company filed two successive liens against 
Defendants'/Appellees' property in connection with its claims in this matter. The first, 
for $150,000, was released not long after its filing; the second, for some $74,000, 
remained pending through trial. 
Yet the jury's verdict - clearly applying Defendants' offset claims - was for just 
over $7,000 total. The conclusion is inescapable that both notices of lien were for 
amounts far in excess of that which J. Pochynok Company was ultimately entitled. The 
conclusion was likewise inescapable that the puipose of the liens' filing was to secure 
payment to Plaintiff for an amount greater than that actually owing. 
7
 Appellees recognize that J. Pochynok Company attempts to make this selfsame argument in an effort to 
defeat their May 9 Offer of Judgment (Appellant's Brief at p. 14). The difference, though, is fundamental: 
Defendants and Appellees were awarded their costs and fees after May 9. The trial court, in otlier words, reviewed 
the issues in their correct order. It looked first to the amount of the verdict, and determined it to be not "more 
favorable than the offer", thus mandating an award of fees after the date of the offer. With those fees included, 
Defendants and Appellees clearly became the "successful parties" under the earlier statute. Plaintiff's/Appellant's 
approach would have this Court turn such analysis on its head, revoking fees which the trial court did award, 
granting fees which it did not award, and reconstructing the balance of success in disregard of determinations by 
both the trial judge and the jury. 
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Under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25, the filing of an excessive lien under the 
circumstances set out above constitutes a misdemeanor.8 It is self-evident that? in taxing 
costs (including attorneys' fees) "according to the right of the case," as mandated by Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-17 and Shape v. Menlove, the Court took into account the fact that the 
mechanics lien which Plaintiff sought to vindicate by this action (as well as its 
predecessor) were shown at trial to be excessive, wrongful and illegal on their face. 
Under such circumstances, Defendants and Appellees were properly awarded their 
attorneys' fees as the "successful parties" 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REJECTING 
PLAINTIFF'S/APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS TO 
DEFENDANTS7APPELLEES' WRIT OF 
GARNISHMENT TO ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
J. Pochynok Company's most mystifying claim on appeal is that the lower court 
committed reversible error in permitting Defendants and Appellees to garnish, from 
J. Pochynok Company's own bank account at Zions First National Bank, funds 
admittedly on deposit there at the time the writ of garnishment was served. J. Pochynok 
Company claims that these funds were not really its property; that they were being held 
8
 Since this action was filed, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25 has been amended to permit a right of civil 
recovery for wrongful lien filing. In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(2) has been added since the filing of this 
action, statutorily denying to a mechanic's lien claimant the right to recover any attorneys' fees whatever in the 
event that its lien filing is adjudged wrongful. While these provisions were not in effect at the time Plaintiffs 
notices of mechanic's liens were filed in this action, they plainly codified what was already clear in the law - that 
the pursuit of excessive mechanic's liens is contrary to public policy. 
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"in trust" for subcontractors on another job. This argument, however, suffers to fatal 
defects, one procedural and the other substantive. 
A. J. Pochynok Company presented no evidence to the trial court to 
support any challenge to the writ of garnishment. 
As noted above, J. Pochynok Company filed a request for hearing on 
September 23, 2002 with respect to the writ of garnishment returned by Zions First 
National Bank on September 12, 2002.9 The procedure thus invoked is set out at Rule 
64D(h), U.R.C.P., which reads in pertinent part as follows: 
The Defendant or any other person who owns or claims an 
interest in the property subject to garnishment that is 
garnisheed may request a hearing to claim any exemption to 
the garnishment, or to challenge the issuance of the writ or the 
accuracy of the answers to interrogatories. . . . The request 
for a hearing shall be in the form to enable the defendant or 
other person to specify the grounds upon which the defendant 
or other person challenges the issuance of the writ or the 
accuracy of the answers to interrogatories. . . 
J. Pochynok Company's request for hearing (R. 724-725) requests a hearing to 
claim an exemption to the Zions' writ of garnishment, but states only that "the basis for 
the exemption is that the funds in J. Pochynok Company, Inc.'s account are owned by 
other persons or entities" (R. 724-725). The court accordingly scheduled a hearing for 
9
 The court's disposition of Pochynok's objections to the writ of garnishment, held, inter alia, that the 
request for hearing had been untimely filed, being more than ten days after the return on the writ of garnishment. 
This was due to a misstatement by Defendants/Appellee's counsel at the hearing, given that the tenth day fell on 
Sunday, September 22, 2002. Given the other failings in Pochynok's proof, and the substance of his objections, the 
error was harmless. Moreover, this issue was disposed of pursuant to Pochynok's Rule 59 U.R.C.P. motion, from 
which no appeal is taken. 
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October 7, 2002. No further submittals, statements, documents or claims were 
forthcoming from Pochynok before the hearing 
At the hearing (of which this court has no transcript due to Pochynok's election 
not to rely on such transcript), J. Pochynok Company presented no evidence whatsoever 
in support of its request for hearing. The court accordingly determined that, based upon 
Zions' answers to garnishee inteixogatories, the funds in the garnisheed account belonged 
to J. Pochynok Company, and were subject to Defendants/Appellees' judgment claim (R 
776-779). The court's ruling in this regard was in full accord with the requirements of 
Rule 64D(h)(3)(i): 
If the court determines at the hearing . . that the assets or a 
portion thereof are subject to garnishment and not exempt, it 
shall issue an order to pay the Property Subject to 
Garnishment directly to plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney or as 
otherwise ordered by the court. . . 
Only after the date and time of the scheduled hearing, and pursuant to a Rule 59, 
U.R.C.P. motion for new trial, did J. Pochynok Company attempt to offer actual 
evidence, in the form of the affidavit of John Pochynok, to the effect that the funds in its 
bank account belonged to someone else. No explanation was given as to why this 
evidence could not have been offered at the October 7 hearing. The trial court denied the 
motion for new trial, and J. Pochynok Company did not appeal therefrom. 
It is incumbent upon any party challenging the ownership of funds in a depository 
account to establish, by clear and convincing evidence that the funds are not the property 
of the account owner - Peterson v. Peterson, 571 P.2d 1360 (1977); Beehive State Bankv. 
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Rosqitisu 21 Utah 2d 17, 439 P.2d 468 (1968). In this case, far from establishing 
ownership of the garnisheed funds in a third party by "clear and convincing evidence", 
J. Pochynok Company failed to offer any evidence at the hearing whatever, seeking to 
rely upon an affidavit filed nine days after the hearing concluded, containing testimony 
never before presented to the Court.10 Plaintiff having failed to carry its burden of proof, 
the only competent evidence before the Court on October 7, 2002 consisted of the sworn 
answers to garnishment interrogatories of Zions First National Bank, which 
acknowledged that the bank was indebted to J. Pochynok Company, Inc. in the amount of 
$37,585.00, the amount maintained in Plaintiffs checking account with Zions. With no 
competent evidence before it to refute Zions' position, the Court properly found the funds 
subject to garnishment, and its ruling was clearly sustained by the evidence. 
B. Even If the Testimony of John Pochynok's Affidavit Had Been 
Presented at the Hearing, it Would Not Have Sustained Plaintiffs 
Burden of Proof 
Even assuming that John Pochynok had taken the stand on October 7 and testified 
in accordance with his October 16, 2002 affidavit, moreover, it would not have 
established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the funds in Plaintiffs bank account 
were not subject to the garnishment by the Smedsruds. By Mr. Pochynok's own 
10
 Plaintiffs attempt to offer an affidavit in support of its motion for a new trial, containing evidence 
which was not presented at trial, invokes not the "insufficient evidence" basis of Rule 59(a)(6), but the "newly 
discovered evidence" basis of Rule 59(a)(4). Plaintiffs decision not to rely on this provision of the Rule, however, 
is understandable - the requirement is that the evidence be such as the movant "could not, with reasonable 
diligence, had discovered and produced at the trial". Plaintiff makes no suggestion that the content of Mr. 
Pochynok's October 16, 2002 affidavit could not have been presented to the Court at the hearing through the 
testimony of Mr. Pochynok himself (who was present in court). 
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admission, Plaintiff/Appellant received funds on deposit in its bank account as of 
September 13, 2002 in its capacity as general contractor on a construction project for 
Steve Young, the project owner (R. 766-769). As such, Plaintiff does not, and cannot 
allege that Mr. Young was indebted to the subcontractors on the project; rather, Mr. 
Young's obligation was to J. Pochynok Company as general contractor. This is 
established by the invoice attached as Exhibit B to Pochynok's memorandum in support 
of its Motion for New Trial (incorporated by reference in paragraph 4 of Mr, Pochynok's 
affidavit, R. 766-769) - it is an invoice from J. Pochynok Company as general contractor 
to Steve Young as owner, merely itemizing payments which J. Pochynok Company - not 
Steve Young - must make to its subcontractors. By Mr. Pochynok's own admission, 
Mr. Young paid the invoice by wire transfer into the garnished account. 
It is noteworthy, in this connection, that Plaintiff has nowhere produced an 
affidavit or other challenge from Mr. Young or any subcontractor claiming that they were 
the owners of the garnished funds. The reason is obvious - Mr. Young performed under 
his building contract with J. Pochynok Company, Inc. by paying the invoice, and 
transferring funds to J. Pochynok Company, Inc. as general contractor. Were the 
garnished funds actually the property of Mr. Young, and not Plaintiff, Mr. Young - not 
Plaintiff- needed to appear before the trial court objecting to the garnishment. He was 
conspicuous by his absence, as were any other alleged owners of the funds. 
The situation in this case is easily distinguishable from that in Peterson v. 
Peterson, 571 P. 2d 1360 (Utah 1977) - it does not involve joint de facto owners of a 
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bank account, as was the case in that decision. Mr. Young paid the funds to J, Pochynok 
Company, as he was contractually obligated to do. The funds, once in the account, were 
J. Pochynok Company's alone, to do with as it pleased, but subject to competing 
obligations, including the judgment in favor of Defendants and Appellees. 
J. Pochynok Company seeks to invoke Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-603 in support of 
the proposition that the funds in his bank account were not subject to garnishment by 
Defendants and Appellees. The statute provides nothing of the sort. It merely provides 
that, when a general contractor receives construction funds from an owner, it must pay 
subcontractors and material men in proportion to the amount of work which they have 
performed on the project. It does not deprive the general contractor of ownership of 
funds paid by the owner. 
Simply put, Plaintiff/Appellant J. Pochynok Company received a progress payment 
on a project, but Defendants and Appellees garnished those funds before J. Pochynok 
Company made payments to its subcontractors. The most that Plaintiff/Appellant can 
make out of this situation is that it would rather have used funds from the project to pay 
subcontractors to the exclusion of Smedsruds. Where a Writ of Garnishment is used in 
aid of a valid judgment, however, the judgment debtor does not retain the option of 
preferring other creditors over the judgment creditor. 
CONCLUSION 
Simply put, Plaintiff and Appellant J. Pochynok Company, Inc. lost at trial It lost 
in any meaningful and practical sense. Defendants'/Appellees' set offs and counterclaims 
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whittled a claim of over $81,000.00 down to less than $7,100.00 Moreover, J. Pochynok 
Company had in hand an offer of $40,000.00 on May 9, 2002 - which, by statute, it 
could reject only with the express understanding that, if this verdict was not larger than 
that amount, it would be responsible for the attorneys' fees of Defendants and Appellees 
incurred after that date. Plaintiff'Appellant elected to accept this risk. The result simply 
cannot support a claim that Pochynok Co. wras the "successful party" in this litigation. 
After the trial, when Defendants and Appellees Smedsruds had the good fortune to 
garnish J. Pochynok Company's bank account after it had received payment from an 
owner, but before it had drained the account with payments to other creditors, 
Plaintiff/Appellant demanded a hearing on the writ of garnishment. However, it did not 
avail itself of the opportunity before the Court, presenting no evidence to support its 
claim that the money deposited by it in its own account did not belong to it. Even after 
the hearing was over, and the Court had ruled against it, Plaintiff/Appellant failed to 
establish any more than that a creditor had seized funds from his bank account before it 
had the opportunity to pay those funds to other creditors. 
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The lower Court ruled properly and prudently on all matters before it. Its rulings 
should be affirmed without exception. 
DATED this J ' '- day of May, 2003. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH,P.C. 
By. 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Ross I. Romero 
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ? ' • day of May, 2003,1 caused to be mailed by 
first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES to the following: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 // 
/ / 
I 
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Tabl 
VINCENT C. RAMPTON (USB #2684) 
ROSS I. ROMERO (USB #7771) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801)521-3200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
Corporation : 
Plaintiffs), : Civil No. 0006000014 
vs. : 
: Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN : 
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, : 
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS, : 
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON : 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation; : 
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation; : 
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO : 
GRANDE PAINTING, : 
Defendant(s). 
TO: PLAINTIFF AND COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANT J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, 
INC. AND COUNSEL 
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §38-1-
18(3), defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs, Greg and LouAnn Smedsrud, offer to allow 
5?"'654\ I 
judgment to be taken against them in the sum of Forty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents 
($40,000.00) in complete and final settlement of all claims by the plaintiff and counterclaim 
defendant against defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs, Greg and LouAnn Smedsrud. If 
plaintiff and counterclaim defendant do not accept this offer and fail to obtain a judgment at trial 
against defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs which is more favorable than this offer, defendants 
and counterclaim plaintiffs will seek reimbursement from the plaintiff and counterclaim 
defendant of all attorneys' fees and costs incurred after making this offer pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §38-1-18(3). Evidence of this offer is inadmissible except in a proceeding to determine to 
attorneys' fees and costs. This offer includes all claims, interest, liens, court costs and attorneys' 
fees whatsoever that plaintiff and counterclaim defendant has made or could against defendants 
and counterclaim plaintiffs. This offer is in lieu of and revokes all prior offers of settlement. 
DATED this f ^ day of May, 2002. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
McDONOUGH 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Ross I. Romero 
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn 
Smedsrud 
537654%1 -2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Offer of 
Judgment was sent via facsimile and hand delivery, to the following this 9^- day of May, 
2002: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Y*~7^z- i*is 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN 
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, 
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS, 
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation; 
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation; 
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO 
GRANDE PAINTING, 
Defendants and Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs. 
JURY VERDICT 
02. o40\3Z$ 
Civil No. 0Q0600Q014-
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
We, the jury, duly empaneled in the above-entitled matter, hold as follows in the above-
entitled action: 
538370vl 
1. Based on the law as it has been explained to us, we find in favor of plaintiff J. 
Pochynok Company, Inc., and against defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud, in the amount 
of$ ^f-OlGSU 
2. Based on the law as it has been explained to us, we find in favor of defendants 
Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud, and against plaintiffs J. Pochynok Company, Inc., in the 
amount of $ . 
DATED this ^D-f day of May, 2002. 
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Tab 3 
IMAGED 
VINCENT C. RAMPTON (USB #2684) 
ROSS I. ROMERO (USB #7771) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
% . 
"Iff© Ms&ttittAK, 
AUG 13
 m i 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN 
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, 
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS, 
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation; 
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation; 
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO 
GRANDE PAINTING, 
Defendants and Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs. 
DATE 
ENTERED !M RZCISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
JUDGMENT UPON VERDICT AND 
ORDER ON POST TRIAL MOTIONS 
ozoqo&zi 
civil No. wmmmr 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
This matter was tried to a jury on May 21 and 22, 2002. Prior to trial, all crossclaims 
between defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud and Pella Products, Inc. had been dismissed 
with prejudice pursuant to stipulation and prior order of this Court. In addition, all claims of 
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plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. against defendants Blaze Wharton Construction, Inc. and 
Jeffrey Kaiser were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure prior to trial. 
On May 22, 2002, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, 
Inc. and against Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud, in the amount of $7,076.56. The jury 
returned no verdict in favor of any other party hereto. 
Following trial, both parties submitted motions for award of costs and attorneys fees 
incurred in the action. In addition, the plaintiff submitted a motion for injunctive relief, asking 
that this Court enjoin defendants from asserting claims or initiating legal proceedings against 
Wynn G. Yelland, Paul V. Nesseth and Locus Architecture, Ltd., by reason of Mr. Yelland 
having agreed to appear and testify at trial herein. 
The Court having reviewed the parties' post-trial motions and supporting submittals, 
being fully advised, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, adjudged and decreed as follows: 
1. The motion of Defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud to tax costs and 
attorneys fees is granted for those reasons set out in defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support 
of Motion to Tax Costs and Attorneys Fees, and their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Tax Costs and Attorneys Fees. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion for Injunctive Relief is denied, for those reasons set out in 
defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Injunctive Relief. 
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3. Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs is denied for those 
reasons set out in defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Award of 
Attorneys Fees and Costs, defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Tax Costs 
and Attorneys Fees, and their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Tax Costs and 
Attorneys Fees. 
4. Based upon the foregoing rulings and upon the jury verdict in this matter, final 
judgment is hereby entered as follows: 
a. Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc., and 
against defendants Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud, jointly and 
severally, in the amount of $7,076.56, together with interest thereon from and 
after May 22, 2002 until paid in full at the contract rate of 12% per annum. 
b. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendants Gregory and LouAnn 
Smedsrud, jointly and severally, and against plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc., 
in the following amounts: 
i. $1,906.94, representing defendants' costs of suit incurred prior to 
May 9, 2002; 
ii. $48,083.10, representing defendants' attorneys fees incurred prior 
to May 9, 2002; 
iii. $766.50, representing defendants' costs of suit incurred on and 
after May 9, 2002; 
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iv. $33,280.00, representing defendants' attorneys fees incurred on 
and after May 9, 2002; and 
v. Interest on the foregoing amounts from and after May 22, 2002 
until paid in full, at the contract rate of 12%. 
c. It is further ordered that the award of defendants' costs and attorneys fees 
as set out above may be augmented in an amount equal to all costs and attorneys 
fees incurred by defendants' from and after June 1, 2002 in the enforcement 
and/or collection of the judgment entered herein, upon further application as 
supported by affidavit of defendants' counsel. 
5. Plaintiffs petition for an order of foreclosure of its mechanic's lien herein is 
denied, as its judgment against Smedsruds, as the owners, is fully offset by judgment in favor of 
Smedsruds herein. 
6. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to release all liens and notices of liens placed by or for 
it upon the Smedsruds' residence located in Summit County, State of Utah, more particularly 
described as follows: 
All of Lot 118, PINERIDGE SUBDIVISION, according to the 
official plat thereof filed in the office of the Recorder of Summit 
County, State of Utah. 
(hereafter "Smedsrud Property"). Plaintiff is hereby declared to hold no right, title or interest in 
and to the Smedsrud Property. Plaintiff is further ordered to release any and all Notices of Lis 
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Pendens filed against the Smedsrud Property with the Summit County Recorder's office in 
connection with this action. 
7. Defendants Butterfield Lumber, Inc., Pella Products, Inc., Blaze Wharton 
Construction, Inc., Dixie Woodworks, Inc., and Jeffrey Kaiser, having failed to present any proof 
to the court in support of any claims which they have or may have against any party hereto, or to 
obtain any verdict or judgment in their favor, are determined to hold no right, title or interest in 
and to the Smedsrud Property, whether jointly or severally, by virtue of any right of mechanic's 
lien asserted by or on behalf of said defendants (or any of them) against the Smedsrud Property. 
Said defendants are hereby ordered to release all liens and notices of mechanics' or 
materialman's lien placed by or for them upon the Smedsrud Property. 
8. Any and all claims asserted by or against any party to this action, to the extent not 
otherwise addressed in this judgment and order, are hereby deemed dismissed with prejudice and 
on the merits. 
DATED this l^f day of August, 2002. 
BY THE COURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the , " day of August, 2002,1 caused to be hand-delivered a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed form of JUDGMENT UPON VERDICT AND 
ORDER ON POST TRIAL MOTIONS to the following: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Scott L. Wiggins 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS 
American Plaza II, ste. 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Randall R. Smart 
Snow, Nuffer 
341 South Main Street, #303 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 /; 
Ralph R. Tate 
4625 South 2300 East, Ste. 206 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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Tab 4 
VINCENT C. RAMPTON (USB #2684) 
ROSS I. ROMERO (USB #7771) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Gregory andLouAnn Smedsrud 
170 South Main Street, Suite #1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH C<A-mz 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a 
Corporation 
Plaintiff-Counterclaim defendant, 
vs. 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN 
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFDELD LUMBER, 
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS, 
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation; 
DLXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation; 
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO 
GRANDE PAINTING, 
Defendants- Counterclaim Plaintiffs. 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT 
Civil No. 020901328 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
DA
"
!
 t-tfr/fi TIME /Z/<* 
UPO! 
<Jx. CPS<W* F DEPUTY/SERVER 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, Garnishee. 
You are hereby ordered and commanded by the Court to hold, until further order of 
this Court, and not pay to Plaintiff any or all money and other personal property of the 
Plaintiff in your possession or under your control, whether now due or hereafter to become 
due, which are not exempt from execution, up to the amount remaining due on the judgment 
or order plus court approved costs in this matter, after offsets being $ 76,959.98. 
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You are required to answer the attached questions called interrogatories, and file your 
answer with the Clerk of the Court within five business days of the date this Writ is served 
upon you. The address of the Clerk is: 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
You are also required to send a copy of your answers to the Defendants, Greg and LouAnn 
Smedsrud at the following address: Ross Romero, Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 
170 South Main Street, Suite #1500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
If you fail to answer, the judgment creditor may ask the Court to make you pay the 
amount you should have withhold. 
If you are indebted to or hold property or money belonging to the Plaintiff, you shall 
immediately mail by first class mail a copy of the Writ of Garnishment and your answer to 
the Interrogatories, the Notice of Garnishment and Exemptions and two (2) copies of the 
Request for Hearing to the Plaintiff and to anyone else who, according to your records, may 
have an ownership or other interest in the property or money at the last known address of the 
Plaintiff or such other persons shown on your records at the time of the service of this Writ. 
In lieu of mailings, you may hand-deliver a copy of these documents to the Plaintiff and 
other persons entitled to copies. 
YOU MAY DELIVER to the officer serving this Writ the portion of Plaintiff s 
earnings or income to be held as shown by your answers. You will then be relieved from 
further liability in this case unless your answers are successfully disputed. You may, in the 
alternative, hold the money until further order of the Court. 
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If you do not receive an order from the Court regarding this Writ and the property 
you held pursuant to this Writ within sixty (60) days after filing your answers to the attached 
Interrogatories, this Writ shall expire and you may ignore it. 
DATED this j £ _ day of September, 2002. 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
Serve Zions First National Bank at: 
Robert A. Goodman 
Legal Services Department, 232-K5 
One South Main Street, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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I INTERROGATORIES TO GARNISHEE f 
(Not for Earnings for Personal Services) 
Page 1 of 3 
Case No: 
Defendants: 
(Give your answers in the spaces provided and attach additional sheets if necessary.) 
1. Are you indebted to the Defendants either in property or money? 
ANSWER: 
2. What is the nature of the indebtedness? 
ANSWER: 
j . What is the total amount of the indebtedness? 
ANSWER: 
4. Is the indebtedness now due? 
ANSWER: 
If not, when is it to become due? 
ANSWER: 
6. Have you in your possession, in your charge, or under your control any property or money 
in which Defendants have an interest other than as set forth in your answers above? 
ANSWER: 
7. If so, identify or describe such property or money and value of Defendants' interest in it. 
Identification or Description Amount or Value of Defendants' Interest 
8. Do you know of any debts owing or which may be owing from any other person to 
Defendants, whether due or not. or of any property of Defendants or in which Defendants 
have an interest in any other person's possession or control? 
ANSWER: 
(RETURN ORIGINAL TO COURT) 
INTERROGATORIES TO GARNISHEE - CONTINUED 
(Not for Earnings for Personal Services) 
Pace 2 of 3 
Case No: 
Defendants: 
If so, state the full particulars thereof. 
Identification or 
Description of Debt 
Right or Item Location 
Third Party 
Debtor, Holder 
or Custodian 
Amount or 
Value of 
Defendants1 
Interest 
10. Have you retained or deducted from the property or money in which are indebted to 
Defendants any amount in payment, in full or in part, of a debt owed by Defendants or 
Plaintiff to you? 
ANSWER: 
11. If so, state the amount so retained or deducted and the person indebted for whom the amount 
has been retained or deducted. 
ANSWER: 
12. Describe any information provided to you by or on behalf of Defendants regarding 
Defendants' property, bank accounts, bank relationships, employment, and all other financial 
information, e.g., via financial statements, applications, etc. In lieu of a written response to 
this interrogator)' request, you may provide copies of any such information provided to you 
by or on behalf of Defendants with your response to these interrogatories. 
ANSWER: 
(RETURN ORIGINAL TO COURT) 
INTERROGATORIES TO GARNISHEE - CONTINUED 
(Not for Earnings for Personal Services) 
Pase 3 of3 
Case No: 
Defendant^: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I do swear or affirm that I am the garnishee or person authorized to execute this document 
and make this verification on behalf of garnishee and that the answers to the foregoing 
interrogatories are true to the best of my information and belief, 
I also swear or affirm that I mailed by first class mail, or hand-delivered a copy of the Writ 
of Gamisliment, Answers to Interrogatories, Notice of Gamisliment and Exemptions and two (2) 
copies of a Request for Hearing, to the Defendants at » 
on the day of , 2001. 
I also swear or affirm that the following other persons were also provided a copy of the Writ 
of Gamisliment, Answers to Interrogatories, Notice of Gamisliment and Exemptions and Request 
for Hearing: 
Person Address Date mailed or delivered 
Signature of Garnishee or Authorized 
Signature on Behalf of Garnishee 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of . 2001. 
• ^ 
•S | NOTARY PUBLIC ^ 
| My commission expires: 
(RETURN ORIGINAL TO COURT) 
Tab 5 
VINCENT C. RAMPTON (USB #2684) 
ROSS I. ROMERO (USB #7771) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim RULING ON WRIT OF 
Defendant, GARNISHMENT 
vs. : 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN : 
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, : 
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS, : Civil No. 020901328 
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON : 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation; : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation; : 
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO : 
GRANDE PAINTING, : 
Defendants and Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs. : 
Defendants Gregory Smedsrud and Louann Smedsrud having caused a Writ of 
Garnishment to issue in the above-entitled proceeding, directed to Zions First National Bank as 
Garnishee; said Writ having been served September 10, 2002, upon Zions First National Bank; 
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Zions First National Bank having served its answers to interrogatories incident to said Writ upon 
Defendants, and upon the Plaintiff-in-judgment Debtor, J. Pochynok Company, Inc., on 
September 13, 2002; and Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. having filed a Request for Hearing 
pursuant to Rule 64D(h), Utah R. Civ. P., the Smedsrud Defendants' Writ of Garnishment was 
called on for hearing by the Court on October 7, 2002, at 9 a.m. Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, 
Inc. was represented by its counsel of record, Brett D. Cragun. The Smedsrud Defendants were 
represented by their counsel of record, Vincent C. Rampton of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough. 
The Court having heard presentations of counsel, having reviewed all submittals of 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. has failed to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that the Writ of Garnishment was issued improperly; that the answers to 
interrogatories are inaccurate; or that any assets garnished thereby are exempt from or are not 
subject to garnishment; 
2. Plaintiffs Request for Hearing was untimely; 
3. Plaintiffs objections to the Writ of Garnishment are therefore declined; 
4. All assets identified in the answers to interrogatories of Garnishee Zions First 
National Bank are subject to garnishment and not exempt; 
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5. Zions First National Bank, as Garnishee, is hereby ordered to pay the Property 
Subject to Garnishment, as identified in its answers to interrogatories in response to the 
Smedsrud Defendants' Writ of Garnishment, directly to counsel for Defendants Gregory and 
LouAnn Smedsrud. 
DATED this 
1/ 
day of October, 2002. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BYTH 
***M*1&1 
By:. 
Brett D. Cragun 
Attorneys for Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
- • • - 4 
I hereby certify that on the • day of October, 2002,1 caused to be mailed by first 
class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed RULING ON 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT to the following: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Scott L. Wiggins 
Arnold & Wiggins 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Randall R. Smart 
Snow, Nuffer 
341 South Main Street, #303 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 / 
Ralph R.Tate 
4625 South 2300 East, Suite 206 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
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